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THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 
AND THE AVAILABILITY 
OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
Stephen A. Saltzburg* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has before it a 
possible addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 707, which reads as 
follows: 
Rule 707.  Testimony by Forensic Expert Witnesses.  If a witness is 
testifying on the basis of a forensic examination [conducted to determine 
whether an evidentiary sample is similar or identical to a source sample], 
[or:  “testifying to a forensic identification”] the proponent must prove the 
following in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 702: 
(a) the witness’s method is repeatable, reproducible, and accurate—as 
shown by empirical studies conducted under conditions appropriate to 
its intended use; 
(b) the witness is capable of applying the method reliably and actually 
did so; and 
(c) the witness accurately states the probative value of [the meaning of] 
any similarity or match between the samples.1 
 
*  Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor, The George Washington University 
Law School.  This Article was prepared for the Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, 
Daubert, and Rule 702, held on October 27, 2017, at Boston College School of Law.  The 
Symposium took place under the sponsorship of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules.  For an overview of the Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword:  
Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459 
(2018). 
 
 1. Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, 
to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert 
and Rule 702 (Oct. 1, 2017), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE OCTOBER 2017 
AGENDA BOOK 371, 381 (2017) (alterations in original) (proposing a new rule, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 707), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
VJ5T-RAG3].  An alternative is to amend Rule 702 by adding a section (b) to read: 
(b) Forensic Expert Witnesses.  If a witness is testifying on the basis of a forensic 
examination [conducted to determine whether an evidentiary sample is similar or 
identical to a source sample] [or:  “testifying to a forensic identification”], the 
proponent must prove the following in addition to satisfying the requirements of 
Rule 702(a):   
(1) the witness’s method is repeatable, reproducible, and accurate—as shown by 
empirical studies conducted under conditions appropriate to its intended use; 
(2) the witness is capable of applying the method reliably and actually did so; and  
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The apparent goals of this new rule are to increase the reliability of forensic 
testimony and, particularly in criminal cases where there is less discovery 
than in civil cases,2 to provide criminal defendants with more information 
with which to challenge the admissibility and the reliability of the 
government’s expert testimony. 
Whether the proposed rule is likely to accomplish these goals is not 
altogether clear.  Any answer requires an analysis of what is necessary for 
defense counsel in criminal cases to be adequately prepared to meet the 
government’s case.  In deciding what is necessary, it is important to focus on 
the duty of defense counsel to investigate a case and the necessary tools 
defense counsel must have available to conduct an adequate investigation. 
To assess the likelihood that the proposed rule will assure better 
representation for criminal defendants, this Article proceeds as follows:  Part 
I provides a general review of the effective assistance of counsel standard.  
Next, Part II focuses on the specific duty of defense counsel to investigate.  
Part III then examines the constitutional right of indigent criminal defendants 
to have expert assistance at government expense.  Part IV proceeds to 
examine proposed Rule 707 and argues that it will not accomplish its purpose 
unless criminal defendants and their counsel have access to expert resources 
that match those relied upon by the government.  Finally, Part V concludes 
by asking an overarching question that every judge and indigent defense 
lawyer ought to ask:  Can defense counsel have a fair opportunity to 
investigate, appropriately assess, and challenge forensic evidence and 
testimony without the assistance of expert testimony? 
I.  THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD 
In cases addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has clearly established that a defense lawyer has a duty to 
investigate as part of adequate pretrial practice.  In Strickland v. Washington,3 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the Court that a defendant who is 
entitled to be represented by counsel—retained or appointed—has a right to 
a lawyer who is not only physically present at a trial but also provides 
effective assistance: 
 Because of the vital importance of counsel’s assistance, this Court has 
held that, with certain exceptions, a person accused of a federal or state 
crime has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot be 
obtained.  That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial 
alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional 
 
(3) the witness accurately states the probative value of [the meaning of] any 
similarity or match between the samples. 
Id. at 380 (providing proposed amendments to Rule 702).  The substance is the same, and for 
simplicity purposes, the focus here will be on proposed Rule 707. 
 2. The focus here is on indigent criminal defendants.  Civil litigants can already depose 
experts and presumably test the criteria set forth in proposed Rule 707 whether or not the Rule 
is adopted and criminal defendants who have sufficient resources can retain their own experts.  
They do not depend on the willingness of courts to appoint defense experts at the government’s 
expense. 
 3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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command.  The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of 
counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the 
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.  An accused is 
entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who 
plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. 
 For that reason, the Court has recognized that “the right to counsel is the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.”4 
Justice O’Connor observed that the Court previously had held that the 
“Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in 
certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about 
how to conduct the defense.”5  She recognized that “[c]ounsel . . . can also 
deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by failing to 
render ‘adequate legal assistance.’”6  Further, Justice O’Connor noted that 
“[t]he Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional 
requirement of effective assistance in the latter class of cases—that is, those 
presenting claims of ‘actual ineffectiveness.’”7 
Justice O’Connor recognized that federal circuit courts had concluded that 
“the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective 
assistance,”8 and she embraced that standard and described some of the basic 
duties of effective lawyers, which include a duty of loyalty, “the overarching 
duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to 
consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant 
informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution,”9 and 
“a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a 
reliable adversarial testing process.”10  In addition, Justice O’Connor 
identified a duty to investigate: 
As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.  In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.  In 
any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be 
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.11 
 
 4. Id. at 685–86 (citations omitted) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938)). 
 5. Id. at 686. 
 6. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 687 (recognizing that all federal courts of appeals have adopted the standard). 
 9. Id. at 688. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 690–91. 
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II.  THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE GENERALLY 
The Supreme Court has taken the duty to investigate seriously, at least in 
capital cases.  In Rompilla v. Beard,12 for example, the Court appeared to 
come close to saying that defense counsel has an obligation to engage in a 
detailed review of the case file for every conviction that the prosecution will 
seek to introduce at the penalty phase of a capital proceeding.  Rompilla’s 
counsel prepared for the capital phase of the case but failed to review the case 
file of a prior criminal trial in which Rompilla was convicted of a violent 
crime, despite the fact that defense counsel had notice that the prosecution 
intended to rely on the prior conviction.13  That case file happened to have 
information concerning Rompilla’s horrific childhood, mental illness, and 
alcoholism, all of which would have been relevant to mitigation.14  Most of 
this information was found in a single place, a transfer petition prepared by 
the Department of Corrections after Rompilla had been convicted.15  Without 
this evidence, defense counsel’s mitigation case consisted of five of 
Rompilla’s family members saying they believed that he was innocent and a 
good man and asking the jury for mercy and Rompilla’s son testifying that 
he loved his father and would visit him in prison.16 
Justice David Souter, writing for the Court, concluded that even though 
defense counsel had done some investigation by interviewing family 
members and reviewing reports by three mental health experts who gave 
opinions at the guilt phase, “the lawyers were deficient in failing to examine 
the court file on Rompilla’s prior . . . conviction.”17  Justice Souter explained: 
There is an obvious reason that the failure to examine Rompilla’s prior 
conviction file fell below the level of reasonable performance.  Counsel 
knew that the Commonwealth intended to seek the death penalty by proving 
Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the use 
or threat of violence, an aggravator under state law.  Counsel further knew 
that the Commonwealth would attempt to establish this history by proving 
Rompilla’s prior conviction for rape and assault, and would emphasize his 
violent character by introducing a transcript of the rape victim’s testimony 
given in that earlier trial. . . .  It is also undisputed that the prior conviction 
file was a public document, readily available for the asking at the very 
courthouse where Rompilla was to be tried.18 
Justice Souter stated that, although the Court was not establishing a per se 
rule that defense counsel must always review case files of all of a defendant’s 
prior convictions, it was unreasonable for counsel not to review the file 
“despite knowing that the prosecution intended to introduce Rompilla’s prior 
 
 12. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 13. Id. at 382. 
 14. Id. at 378, 393. 
 15. Id. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 378 (majority opinion). 
 17. Id. at 383. 
 18. Id. at 383–84. 
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conviction not merely by entering a notice of conviction into evidence but by 
quoting damaging testimony of the rape victim in that case.”19 
In another decision, Hinton v. Alabama,20 the Court held a lawyer’s 
performance to be inadequate for failure to do an adequate investigation.  
Hinton was charged with two murders, convicted, and sentenced to death.21  
At trial, the prosecutor relied almost exclusively on ballistics evidence to tie 
the defendant’s gun to bullets used in the murders.22  Defense counsel (and 
the trial judge) mistakenly believed that the defense was only entitled to $500 
per case (or $1000 in total given that there were two homicide charges) to 
hire a defense expert.23  The defense could only find one expert who would 
testify for $1000, and the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the expert was 
effective in casting doubt on his opinion that the bullets were not fired from 
Hinton’s gun.24 
Both defense counsel and the trial judge were wrong about the limit on 
state-provided funds, since the law had changed to permit the defense to seek 
sufficient funds to hire an adequate expert.25  The state courts agreed with 
Hinton that defense counsel failed the first prong of the Strickland test by 
being unfamiliar with, and wrong about, the law, and the Supreme Court 
agreed with the state courts, concluding that: 
Hinton’s attorney knew that he needed more funding to present an effective 
defense, yet he failed to make even the cursory investigation of the state 
statute providing for defense funding for indigent defendants. . . .  An 
attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case 
combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a 
quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.26 
Lower courts have taken the duty to investigate seriously.  In Frierson v. 
Woodford,27 for example, Frierson sought habeas corpus relief from a death 
sentence imposed by a state court after he was found guilty of first degree 
murder and other offenses.  The Ninth Circuit overturned Frierson’s sentence 
because his defense counsel failed to investigate and offer mitigation 
 
 19. Id. at 389. 
 20. 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (per curiam). 
 21. Id. at 1083, 1086. 
 22. Id. at 1083–84.  
 23. Id. at 1084. 
 24. Id. at 1085. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1088–89.  The state courts had held that Hinton failed to show prejudice because 
the three experts who testified for the defendant during habeas proceedings testified to the 
same conclusion as the defense expert at trial. Id. at 1086–87.  The Supreme Court held that 
the state courts used the wrong analysis because the jury might not have believed the defense 
expert at trial and that:   
if there is a reasonable probability that Hinton’s attorney would have hired an expert 
who would have instilled in the jury a reasonable doubt as to Hinton’s guilt had the 
attorney known that the statutory funding limit had been lifted, then Hinton was 
prejudiced by his lawyer’s deficient performance and is entitled to a new trial. 
Id. at 1089–90. 
 27. 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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evidence at the penalty phase of the case.28  The Ninth Circuit explained the 
duty to investigate as follows: 
Counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation so that he can 
make an informed decision about how best to represent his client.  Thus, 
counsel may render ineffective assistance “where he neither conducted a 
reasonable investigation nor made a showing of strategic reasons for failing 
to do so.”  We have held that a failure to investigate and present, at the 
penalty phase of a capital trial, evidence of organic brain damage or other 
mental impairments, drug abuse, and a dysfunctional family or social 
environment may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The imperative to cast a wide net for all relevant mitigating evidence is 
heightened at a capital sentencing hearing because “[t]he Constitution 
prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of 
factors which might evoke mercy.”  Although counsel’s duty to seek out 
evidence of mitigation is not limitless, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that the failure to pursue avenues of readily available information—such as 
school records, juvenile court and probation reports, and hospital records—
may constitute deficient performance.29 
In Foster v. Lockhart,30 the Court affirmed the grant of habeas corpus relief 
to a state court defendant convicted of rape and summarized its holding: 
Although we prefer not to repeat the graphic testimony at Foster’s trial and 
evidentiary hearing, the explicit details of the rape victim’s story and 
Foster’s impotency show the failure of Foster’s trial attorney to investigate, 
develop, and present the strong defense of Foster’s impotency amounted to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.31 
Foster and his sister told trial defense counsel that his impotency made it 
extremely unlikely, if not impossible, for Foster to have committed the rape 
as described by the victim.32  Defense counsel did not investigate the 
impotency and instead relied on an alibi defense.33  The Eighth Circuit found 
that the failure to investigate was unreasonable because “[r]easonable 
performance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of facts, 
consideration of viable theories, and development of evidence to support 
those theories” and “[a]n attorney must make a reasonable investigation in 
preparing a case or make a reasonable decision not to conduct a particular 
investigation.”34 
 
 28. Id. at 992–93. 
 29. Id. at 989 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 
21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994); then quoting Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th 
Cir. 1999)). 
 30. 9 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 31. Id. at 724. 
 32. Id. at 725. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 726. 
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III.  INVESTIGATION AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
Failure to do an adequate investigation into facts and witnesses is 
obviously the fault of the lawyer.  As we saw in Rompilla, defense counsel 
had the ability to examine the file in Rompilla’s previous rape and assault 
case and to discover the facts revealed by that file.35  In Frierson, defense 
counsel could have sought to interview family members and anyone else 
whom Frierson identified as potentially having mitigation evidence.36  And, 
in Foster, the defendant had former girlfriends who were available to be 
interviewed and who would have corroborated Foster’s claims regarding his 
inability to perform sexually.37  In these cases, there is little reason to believe 
that a competent lawyer would have lacked the skills necessary to do the 
investigation that the courts found wanting. 
A question arises, however, when a defendant is indigent and cannot afford 
to hire a lawyer:  Who will investigate the reliability of forensic evidence 
provided by an expert for the prosecution whose expertise is unlikely to be 
within the ken of most defense counsel?  The logical answer is an expert 
retained by the defense.  But how likely is it that the court will appoint an 
expert to assist the defense?  The answer in most cases, and in many 
jurisdictions, is very unlikely.38 
In Ake v. Oklahoma,39 the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant 
is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to an appointed expert in some 
cases, including Ake’s.40  The state charged Ake with murdering a couple 
and wounding their two children.41  Ake was hospitalized after initially being 
found incompetent to stand trial.42  Subsequently, he responded sufficiently 
 
 35. See generally Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 36. Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 37. Foster, 9 F.3d at 725–26. 
 38. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
853–54 (9th ed. 2010); see also 1 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 10:9 (2010 ed. Supp. 2017); 
David A. Harris, Ake Revisited:  Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for the 
Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REV. 763, 764 (1990).  Some states do better than others at providing 
expert assistance for indigent defendants. See Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and An 
Indigent Defendant’s ‘Right’ to an Expert Witness:  A Promise Denied or Imagined?, 10 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 401, 456–457 & n.535 (2002); Andrew Monaghan Higgins, Note, 
Virginia’s Interpretation of Ake v. Oklahoma:  A Hollow Right, 23 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & 
SOC. JUST. 491, 494 (2017); Aimee Kumer, Comment, Reconsidering Ake v. Oklahoma:  What 
Ancillary Defense Services Must States Provide to Indigent Defendants Represented by 
Private or Pro Bono Counsel?, 18 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 783, 795–98 (2009).  The most 
recent study of indigent defense in federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A (2012), is the 2017 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Criminal Justice 
Act.  See AD HOC COMM., 2017 REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE ACT (2017). The report notes that a survey of “panel” attorneys (appointed by federal 
courts to represent indigents) indicates that 60 percent of these attorneys use expert services 
in just one out of ten cases while only 12 percent use these services in more than half of their 
cases. Id. at XIX.  The report also reveals tremendous disparities among federal districts in the 
use of experts. Id. at 149–56. 
 39. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 40. Id. at 84–87. 
 41. Id. at 70. 
 42. Id. at 71. 
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well to medication that he was declared fit to stand trial.43  At the guilt stage 
of the capital proceeding, he raised an insanity defense.44  Defense counsel 
called and questioned each psychiatrist who had examined Ake while he was 
hospitalized.45  But each doctor indicated on cross-examination that he had 
not diagnosed Ake’s mental state at the time of the offense.46  The jury 
convicted.47  During the sentencing stage, no new evidence was presented.48 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion for the Court reasoned that Ake 
should have had a psychiatrist appointed to assist his defense at both stages: 
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his 
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, 
the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist’s 
assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one.49 
Justice Marshall also addressed the concept of fundamental fairness in an 
adversary system: 
Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of these cases.  
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not 
by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a 
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an 
indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw 
materials integral to the building of an effective defense.50 
The Court borrowed a procedural due process test used in civil cases to 
balance the defendant’s need for help against the burden on the state of 
providing help.  It found (1) a strong “private interest” in life and liberty, and 
the importance of avoiding an unjust conviction, (2) no governmental interest 
in prevailing at trial if the result “is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict 
obtained,”51 and (3) a great value in providing expert assistance to a 
defendant when his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant 
factor at trial and when the government presents psychiatric evidence 
concerning future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding.52 
Justice Marshall described what psychiatrists can do in a case in which 
sanity is a disputed issue: 
[P]sychiatrists gather facts, through professional examination, interviews, 
and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the 
information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the 
defendant’s mental condition, and about the effects of any disorder on 
behavior; and they offer opinions about how the defendant’s mental 
condition might have affected his behavior at the time in question.  They 
 
 43. Id. at 71–72. 
 44. Id. at 72. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 73. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 79. 
 50. Id. at 77. 
 51. Id. at 78. 
 52. Id. at 78–83. 
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know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party’s psychiatrists 
and how to interpret their answers.53 
Justice Marshall’s reasoning, while confined to psychiatrists, explains what 
experts in other fields can readily do to aid a defense when forensic evidence 
might be disputed. 
It did not take long for the Court to establish that an indigent defendant’s 
right to an appointed expert under Ake is not automatic and only exists when, 
without an expert, the defendant will be deprived of a fair opportunity to 
present his defense.  In Caldwell v. Mississippi,54 Caldwell shot and killed 
the owner of a small grocery store in the course of robbing it and was 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.55  Justice Marshall again 
wrote for the Court as it invalidated the death sentence because the sentencing 
jury was led to believe by the prosecutor’s closing argument that 
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence was 
not a decision for the jury but for the appellate court that would review the 
case.56  In a footnote, Justice Marshall wrote: 
Petitioner also raises a challenge to his conviction, arguing that there was 
constitutional infirmity in the trial court’s refusal to appoint various experts 
and investigators to assist him.  Mississippi law provides a mechanism for 
state appointment of expert assistance, and in this case the State did provide 
expert psychiatric assistance to Caldwell at state expense.  But petitioner 
also requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, 
and a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied.  The State Supreme 
Court affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no 
showing as to their reasonableness.  For example, the defendant’s request 
for a ballistics expert included little more than “the general statement that 
the requested expert ‘would be of great necessarius witness.’”  Given that 
petitioner offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested 
assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due process in the 
trial judge’s decision.  We therefore have no need to determine as a matter 
of federal constitutional law what if any showing would have entitled a 
defendant to assistance of the type here sought.57 
 
 53. Id. at 80. 
 54. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
 55. Id. at 324. 
 56. Id. at 341. 
 57. Id. at 323 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 812 (Miss. 
1983)).  In Caldwell, the Mississippi Supreme Court cited a case decided two years after Ake 
for the following proposition:  “Neither the United States Constitution nor the Mississippi 
Constitution requires that the nation or state furnish an indigent defendant with the assistance 
of a psychiatrist.  The only assistance that they require is the assistance of legal counsel.” 
Caldwell, 443 So. 2d at 812 (quoting Phillips v. State, 197 So. 2d 241, 244 (Miss. 1967)), 
rev’d, 472 U.S. 320.  The Mississippi Supreme Court continued: 
In the case of Bullock v. State, 391 So. 2d 601 (Miss. 1980), this Court went further 
to say that the failure to outline specific costs and in specific terms the purposes and 
value of such requested expert rendered the trial court’s refusal to authorize such 
expenditure non reversible.  In the instant case Caldwell’s motion simply included 
the general statement that the requested expert “would be of necessarius witness.”  
It did not estimate the cost of such expert nor the specific value.  Therefore, the trial 
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In McWilliams v. Dunn,58 the Supreme Court returned to Ake in another 
capital case.  Alabama charged the indigent McWilliams with rape and 
murder.59  The trial court appointed counsel who requested a psychiatric 
evaluation of McWilliams.60  The court granted the motion and the State 
convened a panel of doctors (a three-member “Lunacy Commission”), which 
concluded that McWilliams was competent to stand trial and had not been 
suffering from mental illness at the time of the alleged offense.61  After a jury 
convicted McWilliams of capital murder, his counsel sought neurological and 
neuropsychological testing prior to McWilliams’s sentencing hearing.62  Dr. 
Goff examined McWilliams and filed a report two days before the hearing in 
which he concluded that, although McWilliams appeared to have some 
genuine neuropsychological problems, it was likely that he was exaggerating 
his symptoms.63  Defense counsel also received updated records from the 
Lunacy Commission’s evaluation and previously subpoenaed mental health 
records from the Alabama Department of Corrections.64  Defense counsel 
requested a continuance in order to evaluate all the new material and asked 
for the assistance of someone with expertise in psychological matters to 
review the findings.65  The trial court denied defense counsel’s requests and 
sentenced McWilliams to death.66 
Justice Breyer, writing for five members of the Court, observed that the 
Constitution, as interpreted in Ake, required the state to provide McWilliams 
with more expert assistance than he actually received.67  He concluded that 
the examination provided by the state through Dr. Goff was no substitute 
because “Ake does not require just an examination.  Rather, it requires the 
State to provide the defense with access to ‘a competent psychiatrist who will 
conduct an appropriate [1] examination and assist in [2] evaluation, [3] 
preparation, and [4] presentation of the defense.’”68 
Justice Breyer was willing to assume that Dr. Goff satisfied the 
examination requirement of Ake but found that neither he nor any other expert 
(1) helped the defense to evaluate Goff’s report or McWilliams’s extensive 
medical records, (2) helped to translate these data into a legal strategy, (3) 
helped the defense to prepare and present arguments addressing an 
explanation for McWilliams’s purported malingering, (4) helped the defense 
 
court’s failure to provide the requested expert witness or investigator did not 
constitute reversible error. 
Id. 
 58. 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017). 
 59. Id. at 1794. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1794–95. 
 62. Id. at 1795. 
 63. Id. at 1795–96. 
 64. Id. at 1796. 
 65. Id. at 1796–97. 
 66. Id. at 1797. 
 67. Id. at 1798 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)). 
 68. Id. at 1800 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83). 
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to prepare direct or cross-examination of any witnesses, or (5) testified for 
the defense at the judicial sentencing hearing.69 
McWilliams had argued that Ake “clearly established that a State must 
provide an indigent defendant with a qualified mental health expert retained 
specifically for the defense team, not a neutral expert available to both 
parties.”70  Justice Breyer did not decide whether McWilliams was correct 
but noted that “[a]s a practical matter, the simplest way for a State to meet 
this standard may be to provide a qualified expert retained specifically for the 
defense team.”71 
IV.  THE NEED FOR EXPERT HELP FOR THE LAWYER 
In Rompilla, the Court faulted defense counsel and found ineffective 
assistance where defense counsel, knowing that the prosecution would rely 
upon a prior conviction, failed to examine the file relating to the case.72  The 
Court reasonably assumed that a lawyer who examines a court file is 
generally capable of reading the documents in the file and ascertaining the 
factual evidence that the prosecution could choose to use in a sentencing 
hearing.73  By contrast, in Ake and McWilliams, the Court reasonably 
concluded that when a defendant’s mental state and sanity are at issue, 
defense counsel cannot be expected to master psychiatric evidence that an 
expert might rely upon.  This raises the question whether a defense lawyer, 
in any case in which the government relies upon forensic expert testimony, 
is in a position to properly evaluate the various factors that must be 
considered when the forensic expert testimony is proffered at trial.  If one 
considers what Justice Marshall wrote in Ake and tweaks it slightly, it seems 
apropos to all forensic experts.  Forensic experts “gather facts, through 
professional examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with 
the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered and from it draw 
plausible conclusions”74 about the significance of those facts to the issues in 
a case.  They know the probative questions to ask of the opposing party’s 
experts and how to interpret their answers. 
Similarly, a slight tweaking of Justice Breyer’s observation in McWilliams 
seems to extend its applicability not only to mental health experts but to all 
forensic experts:  “Ake does not require just an examination.  Rather, it 
requires the State to provide the defense with access to ‘a competent [forensic 
expert] who will conduct an appropriate [1] examination and assist in [2] 
evaluation, [3] preparation, and [4] presentation of the defense.’”75 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1799.  The Court granted certiorari to decide whether this was correct, but Justice 
Breyer concluded that “that does not bind [the Court] to issue a sweeping ruling when a narrow 
one will do.” Id. at 1800. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 382 (2005). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985). 
 75. McWilliams, 137 S. Ct. at 1800 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83). 
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The reality is that many judges are reluctant to appoint defense counsel for 
indigent defendants absent some showing of exceptional need.  So why is it 
that some federal judges, as well as their state counterparts, are unwilling to 
appoint defense experts at the government’s expense whenever the 
government is relying on forensic evidence other than psychiatric testimony?  
Can it really be that judges think that psychiatric evidence is the only forensic 
evidence that is beyond the ken of defense counsel?  Or do they think 
psychiatric testimony is that much more complicated than other forensic 
evidence?  These explanations are unlikely.  More probably, reluctance to 
appoint defense experts is rooted in cost to the government and inertia; that 
is, a history of not routinely providing defense experts at the request of 
defense counsel.76 
Prosecutors frequently rely upon forensic evidence, and science has an 
ever-increasing role to play in criminal trials.77  As a result, it is important 
that defense counsel be prepared to address such evidence and have the tools 
to do so, whether the defense is insanity or any other defense that involves a 
challenge to the reliability of forensic evidence.  Proposed Rule 707 provides 
an opportunity to examine specifically what defense counsel needs and why 
the proposed rule itself cannot guarantee fairness.  Under the proposed rule, 
the proponent of forensic evidence must prove three things in addition to 
satisfying Rule 702: 
(a) the witness’s method is repeatable, reproducible, and accurate—as 
shown by empirical studies conducted under conditions appropriate to its 
intended use; 
(b) the witness is capable of applying the method reliably and actually did 
so; and 
(c) the witness accurately states the probative value of [the meaning of] any 
similarity or match between the samples.78 
 
 76. An epidemic of wrongful convictions associated with forensic evidence is proof that 
without expert assistance, defense lawyers may provide inadequate representation in a large 
number of cases. See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, Chemist’s Misconduct Is Likely to Void 20,000 
Massachusetts Drug Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2oTeW7a 
[https://perma.cc/7D56-5V6X].  The decision was made to dismiss more than 8000 cases. See 
Tom Jackman, Massachusetts Prosecutors to Throw Out 8,000 Convictions in Second Drug 
Lab Scandal, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-
crime/wp/2017/12/28/massachusetts-prosecutors-to-throw-out-8000-convictions-in-second-
drug-lab-scandal [https://perma.cc/5PN6-K4XC]. 
 77. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma:  The Right to Expert Assistance in 
a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004).  Giannelli concludes as 
follows: 
In 1985, the Ake Court could not have anticipated how the advent of DNA evidence 
would revolutionize forensic science or how [Daubert] would alter the judicial 
approach to scientific evidence.  It could not have foreseen the scientific fraud cases 
or the expanded use of social science and modus operandi experts.  All of these 
developments have increased the need for defense experts. 
Id. at 1418; see also Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific 
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1559 (1995). 
 78. Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 1, at 381. 
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Suppose defense counsel, having received notice that the government 
intends to rely on forensic ballistics evidence and other forensic testimony, 
stands before a federal district court judge after filing a motion for 
appointment of one or more defense experts.79  The following is a 
hypothetical colloquy focused on the request for a ballistics expert that, while 
imagined, reflects the reality in many courts. 
COURT:  Counsel, you have a motion pending for appointment of a 
ballistics expert.  Has the government supplied you with a report of its 
expert?  And, if so, why do you need an expert? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  We have the government expert’s report, your 
Honor, but we have no way of knowing whether the expert is actually 
qualified, by training or experience, to testify as required pursuant to Rule 
702, or whether the other requirements of that Rule are satisfied. 
COURT:  Have you any reason to question his expertise? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I have no reason to question his expertise or to 
accept that it is sufficient. 
COURT:  Is there anything specific about the expert that gives you a 
problem? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  No, I have nothing specific because I am not 
qualified to know whether or not he is qualified. 
COURT:  Any other reason you need a defense expert? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Yes.  The Advisory Committee on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence is considering a proposed Rule 707 and, while it is not 
yet the law, it seems to me that it sets forth what any proponent of expert 
testimony should have to prove. 
COURT:  So, let’s focus on the requirements in that proposed rule.  What 
comes first? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  The proponent must show that “the witness’s 
method is repeatable, reproducible, and accurate—as shown by empirical 
studies conducted under conditions appropriate to its intended use.”80 
COURT:  Does the report do that? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  It purports to. 
COURT:  So what’s the problem? 
 
 79. Justice Marshall’s footnote in Caldwell dismissed Caldwell’s claim that he should 
have had experts appointed for the defense in these words: 
[Caldwell] requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, 
and a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied.  The State Supreme Court 
affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to 
their reasonableness. . . .  Given that petitioner offered little more than undeveloped 
assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation 
of due process in the trial judge’s decision. 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 320 n.1 (1985).  Justice Marshall did not mention 
whether the prosecution relied on fingerprint and ballistics experts, and, if they did, why 
Caldwell did not need expert assistance to deal with their testimony. See id. 
 80. See Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 1, at 381. 
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DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I have no expertise in ballistics and am ill 
equipped to assess whether the studies that the expert relies on are reliable, 
or whether based on those studies the expert’s method is repeatable, 
reproducible, and accurate. 
COURT:  But the expert says they are reliable and that his method is 
satisfactory. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Lay witnesses come to court all the time and 
purport to have reliable testimony.  As a lay person myself, I am competent 
to examine them and point out deficiencies.  I am not competent in a 
scientific area in which I completely lack expertise. 
COURT:  Okay.  But, at the moment you cannot point to anything specific 
in the expert’s report that alarms you? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  True, but I don’t know whether I should be 
alarmed. 
COURT:  What else is required by proposed Rule 707? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  The proponent must show that “the witness is 
capable of applying the method reliably and actually did so.”81 
COURT:  What does the report say about that? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  It says that the author is capable of applying the 
method reliably and did so. 
COURT:  So what is the problem? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  As I said earlier, I have no way of knowing 
whether the expert is qualified in ballistics generally, and I certainly have 
no way of being sure that he applied the method reliably. 
COURT:  But at the moment it is fair to say that there is nothing in the 
report that you can point to that suggests the expert is not being honest? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I can’t point to anything specific.  But this expert 
works for the government, which means he has an obvious bias, and makes 
me wonder whether he has applied his method reliably.  It is not that I think 
the expert is not being honest.  I don’t know whether or not he is.  But, 
assuming he is being honest, honest experts can be wrong, sometimes very 
wrong, and I have no way to test the application of the method he described. 
COURT:  Here’s your answer.  You can impeach him for bias and cross-
examine him about both his method and how he applied it.  Anything else 
in proposed Rule 707? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  The proponent must show that “the witness 
accurately states the probative value of [the meaning of] any similarity or 
match between the samples.”82 
COURT:  Did the expert do that? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  The report says that he did. 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
2018] DUTY TO INVESTIGATE & AVAILABILITY 1723 
COURT:  And do you have any reason to challenge that? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I have neither reason to challenge it nor reason to 
accept it.  The problem is I lack sufficient training and experience to deal 
with the forensics. 
COURT:  Well, this court has been dealing with forensic testimony for a 
long time without appointing defense experts, and defense lawyers like you 
have proven capable of cross-examining those experts.  So, I am not 
inclined to appoint a ballistics expert absent a showing of exceptional need, 
and there is none before me.  If I accept your arguments, I would have to 
appoint an expert for the defense in every case to correspond to each 
forensic expert relied upon by the government, and this court has never 
done that. 
Every point that defense counsel makes in the above colloquy could in fact 
be made, as the court in the colloquy suggests, to each forensic expert relied 
upon by the government in every criminal case.  Appointing defense experts 
at government expense would undoubtedly add to the expense of processing 
criminal cases.  But the bottom-line question is whether defense counsel can 
meet the duty to investigate fully without expert assistance, and it is difficult 
to see how that can be done. 
Do state trial judges and federal district judges who deny the appointment 
of experts have reason to worry that any conviction will be reversed for abuse 
of discretion?  Thus far, appellate courts seem to give great deference to the 
judgment of trial judges.83  It is therefore unlikely that a trial court will be 
reversed for declining to appoint a defense expert when the defendant has 
failed to make a showing of some exceptional need. 
A defendant who fails on direct appeal is generally out of luck because in 
noncapital postconviction proceedings,84 the defendant will be unable to 
demonstrate one of the prongs necessary to establish ineffective assistance of 
 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A 
district court’s denial of a request for public funds to hire an expert is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.”); accord United States v. Benitez, 809 F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 84. Fortunately, in capital cases courts somehow have been able to appoint counsel or find 
lawyers to volunteer to represent individuals sentenced to death, even though the Supreme 
Court (without a majority opinion) refused to hold in Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), 
that state courts are constitutionally required to appoint counsel for indigents seeking to attack 
death sentences in state collateral proceedings.  Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, 
wrote that “[t]he complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that 
capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the 
assistance of persons learned in the law.” Murray, 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
He also noted that 
[w]hile Virginia has not adopted procedures for securing representation that are as 
far reaching and effective as those available in other States, no prisoner on death 
row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in post-conviction 
proceedings, and Virginia’s prison system is staffed with institutional lawyers to 
assist in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief. 
Id. at 14–15.  It is not clear that lawyers will continue to be available to all persons convicted 
of capital offenses who seek habeas corpus review.  The 2017 Report on the Criminal Justice 
Act observed that the director of the American Bar Association’s Death Penalty 
Representation Project told the ad hoc committee that it is “enormously time consuming and 
difficult” to recruit law firms in capital cases. See AD HOC COMM., supra note 38, at 202. 
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counsel.  The defendant might be able to make a showing that counsel failed 
to provide competent representation by being unable to adequately 
investigate the government’s expert testimony.  But, even with respect to the 
first prong of an ineffectiveness claim, the challenge would be to show that 
defense counsel’s performance was outside the mainstream of what is 
expected of defense counsel, and, because courts routinely deny appointment 
of defense experts, it would seem that the defendant would have great 
difficulty in showing that counsel’s failure to have an expert was atypical and 
amounted to a less-than-competent effort. 
Even if a court were to find that the inability to adequately investigate and 
challenge government expert testimony amounted to an incompetent effort, 
it is virtually certain that the defendant would be unable to prove prejudice.  
To prove prejudice, the defendant would need to have the benefit of expert 
testimony.  Otherwise, there would be no way to show that had there been a 
court-appointed defense expert at trial, the trial would have unfolded 
differently.  Since the defendant is not even entitled to appointed counsel in 
a postconviction attack on a conviction,85 there is little chance that the 
indigent defendant will have the assistance of an expert. 
V.  THE OVERARCHING QUESTION 
The overarching question for defense counsel and judges is this:  Can 
defense counsel have a fair opportunity to investigate, appropriately assess, 
and challenge forensic testimony without the assistance of expert testimony?  
Justice Breyer hit the nail on the head in McWilliams when he described the 
contribution a defense expert in psychiatry might make:  the expert “will 
conduct an appropriate [1] examination and assist in [2] evaluation, [3] 
preparation, and [4] presentation of the defense.”86  There is no a priori 
reason to believe that this is less the case when non-mental-health forensic 
evidence is presented. 
It seems logical, then, that competent defense lawyers would always 
consult their own experts in preparing to confront government experts.  
Wealthy defendants can retain their own experts.  Federal defenders have 
resources that enable them to retain experts.  But counsel appointed under the 
Criminal Justice Act87 and by many state courts generally need judicial 
approval to obtain funds for expert testimony.  There is yet no standard that 
requires appointment of experts simply because defense counsel claims a lack 
of expertise in the subject matter of forensic testimony. 
Proposed Rule 707 is useful in stating the factors that prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and all trial judges should focus on when forensic testimony is going 
to be presented by the government in a criminal case.88  If the prosecutor is 
the proponent of expert testimony, the prosecutor can focus the expert on 
 
 85. See generally Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
 86. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1800 (2017) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68, 83 (1985)). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012). 
 88. See supra Introduction. 
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these factors and make the case that they are satisfied.  Unless the court 
appoints an expert for the defense, defense counsel will have no basis to 
assess the testimony provided by the prosecution’s expert, and the court itself 
generally is in no position to identify sua sponte any defects in the forensic 
testimony.  The court could appoint an expert pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706.89  If the court were inclined to use public funds for this 
purpose, however, there is good reason to believe that those funds would be 
better spent by providing the defense with the expert so that the factors under 
proposed Rule 707 could be assessed in an adversarial setting. 
The vast majority of federal and state criminal cases are disposed of by 
plea,90 which might suggest that because only the infrequent case goes to 
trial, motions to appoint expert witnesses for indigent defendants could be 
limited to those cases.  But, there are cases in which prosecutors rely upon 
forensic evidence while plea bargaining.  If a defendant’s decision whether 
to take a plea or risk a trial depends to any significant extent on the 
importance of the forensic evidence, is a defense counsel in any better 
position than at a trial to evaluate that evidence without the help of an expert?  
The law is clear that defense counsel must provide competent advice at the 
plea stage as well as provide competent representation at trial.91  It would be 
wrong, then, to conclude that counsel for indigent defendants will not seek 
appointment of defense experts prior to trial while plea bargaining is 
underway, and equally wrong to conclude that they have a lesser need for 
expert assistance than lawyers who go to trial. 
Proposed Rule 707 would, if enacted, apply only in federal courts.  But the 
issues that it identifies surrounding forensic testimony should be equally 
applicable in state courts, whether or not states have a similar or identical 
rule.  Each of the concerns raised in this Article about the competency of 
defense counsel applies in every trial court and for all plea bargains, whether 
a case proceeds in state or federal court.  Thus, every factor set forth in the 
proposed rule is something that any court with a rule akin to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 should already consider in determining whether an expert is 
qualified, has testimony that would assist the trier of fact in understanding a 
 
 89. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“Appointment Process.  On a party’s motion or on its own, the 
court may order the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and 
may ask the parties to submit nominations.  The court may appoint any expert that the parties 
agree on and any of its own choosing.  But the court may only appoint someone who consents 
to act.”). 
 90. From 2008 through 2012, the federal cases disposed of by trial decreased each year to 
a low of 3 percent in 2012. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (2012), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2012/FigureC_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5EGT-Q4D4].  From 2012 through 2016, the cases disposed of by trial 
declined each year to a low of 2.7 percent in 2016. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2016 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2016/FigureC 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLS3-LFRN].  State court plea rates might be slightly lower but the 
overall estimate of cases disposed of by plea in the United States is approximately 95 percent.  
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). 
 91. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138 (2012); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
156, 174–75 (2012). 
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fact in dispute,92 testifies based on reliable methodology,93 has sufficient 
facts or data, and applies the reliable methodology in a reliable way to those 
facts and data.94 
The final question is then whether proposed Rule 707 will, if adopted, 
serve as an important step in assuring that only reliable forensic testimony is 
admitted in federal district courts and, if admitted, is properly assessed and 
weighed by trial juries.  The proposed rule might give district judges 
additional guidance on what to demand from forensic witnesses.  But, 
without experts available to assist defense counsel in dealing with forensic 
testimony, proposed Rule 707 is unlikely to do the work that the drafters 
believe needs to be done. 
 
 
 92. The language in proposed Rule 707 that “the witness is capable of applying the method 
reliably and actually did so” focuses on both the qualifications of the witness and the reliable 
application of methodology, which are already required by Rule 702. Compare Memorandum 
from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 1, at 381 (providing text of proposed Rule 707), with FED. 
R. EVID. 702. 
 93. The language in proposed Rule 707 that “the witness’s method is repeatable, 
reproducible, and accurate—as shown by empirical studies conducted under conditions 
appropriate to its intended use” seems to focus on the reliable methodology required by Rule 
702. Compare Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 1, at 381 (providing text of 
proposed Rule 707), with FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 94. The language in proposed Rule 707 that “the witness accurately states the probative 
value of [the meaning of] any similarity or match between the samples” appears to require 
reliable application of the methodology, which is required by Rule 702. Compare 
Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, supra note 1, at 381 (providing text of proposed Rule 
707), with FED. R. EVID. 702. 
